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Abstract Human evolution can be divided into two dis-
tinct phases: (1) in the first, human evolution depends on the
DNA-gene information based on direct and predictable
processes, and (2) in the second, human evolution depends
on the neuronal networks which generate complex and non-
predictable effects. In the first phase, the information nec-
essary for the generation of the neuronal cells depends on the
DNA-gene information, while the second phase is connected
with the formation of complex neuronal networks which is
largely independent from DNA-gene information.
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1 To what extent does the human mind–brain system
contributes to physiological functions and evolution?
In human evolution, the mind contributes to the develop-
ment of several fundamental properties: (a) the functions
involved in communication such as language, vision and
many others, (b) the products responsible of the generation
of culture, science, morality, technology, art and others,
(c) the generation of intentionality which is essential for the
activation and the regulation of the human behaviours, and
(d) the generation of one of the most fundamental mind
function, namely that of the free-will.
The evolution of the human brain is characterized by the
development of a gigantic number of synaptic connections
between neurons endowed with two types of prolongations,
namely axons and dendrites. The operation of a neuronal
network is dependent upon: (a) the length of the axons and
dendrites, and (b) the billions and billions of synaptic inter-
neuronal connections (say about 10,000 connections for
each prolongation, up to a total number higher than 1014
total connections). New properties are generated by the
neuronal networks by procedures that are unique in each
human mind. One example is that of human language,
emerged 80,000–100,000 years ago, possibly because of
mutations in the Broca’s area in the frontal cerebral cortex,
and which is essential for the full activity of the human
brain. Intentionality and language are essential tools by
which the mind–brain system regulates the behaviours of
human beings and their relationships with the outer world.
Another fundamental function of the mind–brain system is
that of introducing free-will in human behaviours. Free-
will behaviours require: (a) the presence of a large variety
of multiple connections between the gaps of the neuronal
networks, and (b) the use of intentionality to perform
multiple selections. At variance with non-human species,
the evolutionary development of the members of the
human species occurs by means of two different mecha-
nisms: (a) the first mechanism, lasting between 9 and
18 months, is that which utilizes the information provided
by the DNA-gene system, (b) the second mechanism is
determined by the development of the human personality.
In this second mechanism, two new types of operations
are developed: first, the developments of language and
intentionality, and second, the generation of free-will
and voluntary behaviours. These operations lead to the
development of culture, science, technology, art and
morality.
This contribution is the written, peer-reviewed version of a paper
presented at the Golgi Symposium on Perspectives in
Neuroaesthetics, held at the Accademia Nazionale dei Lincei in Rome
on June 13, 2011.
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2 Do the mutation–selection mechanisms provide
a satisfactory explanation of the human evolution?
In the biological world, the concept of evolution is linked
to the name of Darwin; the discovery of the DNA’s role in
the transmission of information in the new generation has
consolidated the Darwinian conception. It has become,
then, generally accepted that evolutionary processes, based
on the information generated by a mechanism of mutation–
selection and transmitted by DNA and genes, are capable
of explaining all the evolutionary changes that have
occurred in the past, and will continue to occur in the
future, in both non-human and human species.
Some years ago, a great French scientist Monod (1970),
suggested that all evolutionary processes, including those
of the human species, operate by means of a mechanism
defined as of chance and necessity. The question then
arises as to whether the mechanism of chance and necessity
can provide a complete and satisfactory explanation of
human evolution. In major dictionaries, for example, evo-
lution has also been defined as follows: a gradual and
complete development or act; the slow and gradual tran-
sition of inferior and rudimentary organisms to more
complex forms. Why there are such wide differences in the
description of the evolutionary human processes: from
where and how do these differences arise?
3 The limits of an evolution dependent
only on the DNA-gene systems
I shall now defend the thesis that whereas the definition of
the evolutionary processes, as determined by the mecha-
nisms of mutation and natural selection, may be accepted
without objection when dealing with the evolutions of non-
human species, this is not the case when the problem is that
of explaining human evolution. In my view, the definition
of evolutionary processes only as products of a Darwinian
type of evolution, based on information provided directly
by, or generated indirectly through, the DNA-gene system
is too limited. The term Darwinian evolution is not suffi-
cient to explain the generation of the wide information
necessary for the full development of the human species
(see Searle 1992, 1997, 2001, 2002, 2004). My conclusion
(Azzone 2002, 2003, 2008, 2009, 2010a, b, c) is that
human evolution cannot be explained only on the basis of
the processes depending on the DNA-gene information (cf.
Crick 1994; Churchland 1998; Chalmers 2002; Slimansky
2002; Wegner 2003; Richerson and Boyd 2006; Ayala
2009).
My view is that: (a) evolutionary processes operating in
the human world are not dependent only on the DNA-gene
dependent information, and (b) human beings are equipped
also with other very complex, additional, mechanisms
which play an important role in human evolution. I shall,
then, discuss the evidence in favour of the views that: (a) in
the human world there is a much more complex evolution,
which is also of a different nature with respect to evolution
in the non-human world, and (b) the neuronal networks,
operating within the human brain, generate new types of
evolution based on purposeful behaviour and language.
4 The distinction between the two phases
of human evolution
The most important difference between human and non-
human evolutions is that while both human and non-human
organisms are subject to DNA-gene dependent processes,
the human world is also open to the much more extensive
influence of purposeful processes produced by complex
neuronal networks. The profound difference is that human
biological processes are also dependent on the products of
neuronal networks and on intentional information. My
view, therefore, is that in human evolution the mind–brain
system determines processes of adaptation, self-organiza-
tion and creativity, which are, to a large extent, indepen-
dent from the contribution of the DNA-gene system.
Which are, then, the two most significant differences
between the evolutions of the non-human and the human
worlds? First, while in the evolution of non-human species
the effects produced by intentions (purposeful behaviour)
are almost negligible, in human evolution the effects gen-
erated by the complex neuronal networks and caused by
intentions are of primary importance. Second, the DNA-
gene dependent non-human evolution involves events and
behaviours which are mostly homogenous and predictable,
whereas intentionality-dependent human evolution involves
events and behaviours which are mostly non-homogenous
and non-predictable.
5 Memes and neuronal networks
Several years ago, Dawkins (1976, 1986) proposed the
term meme to indicate the concept of ‘‘units of the neural-
cultural transmission across generations’’ within the gen-
eral scheme of Darwin evolution. For Dawkins, examples
of memes are: the contents of scientific theories, ideologies,
literature, arts, religions, human rights, tolerance, and so
on. In Dawkins’ analysis, the memes should be considered
as similar to the genes being carriers of immortal essential
properties for the continuity of their cultural contents. A
somewhat similar proposal had been advanced, almost
simultaneously, by Cavalli Sforza and Feldman (1981),
who have used the expression ‘‘cultural character’’ to
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indicate a unit of cultural evolution and reproduction. More
recently, an adaptation of Darwin’s concept to religion has
been described by Ayala (2009).
The neuronal networks, introduced in the present paper,
operate as the memes of Dawkins and the unit of cultural
character of Cavalli-Sforza and Feldman. The replacement
of the terms memes and cultural character with that of
neuronal networks is based on two considerations. The first
is that in the absence of biological references memes and
cultural character appear as a sort of metaphysical entities.
On the contrary, the concept of neuronal networks indicates
the well-defined role of a large set of components of the
human brain–mind. The second consideration is that, dur-
ing the whole life, the operation of the neuronal networks is
accessible to analysis by the neuroimaging technique based
on functional magnetic resonance and other modern tech-
niques for brain analysis.
6 The generation of neuronal networks
When and how did human beings acquire, by means of
neuronal networks, the capacity to promote a completely
new evolution with respect to the evolution solely based on
the DNA-gene system? Although the information neces-
sary for the generation of each neuronal cell is always
provided by the DNA-gene system, when, why and how has
the information generated by neuronal networks become
almost completely independent from that generated by the
DNA-gene system? I shall now discuss two different
aspects of these problems in order to explain: (a) the dif-
ferences between the two worlds, human and non human,
and (2) why, in human beings, the information provided by
the mind structures is so deeply different from the infor-
mation provided by the DNA-gene systems.
First, it should be remembered that neuronal cells with
their axons and dendrites are not static but active entities,
in that their synaptic interconnections can change contin-
uously, thus establishing novel combinations within the
neuronal networks of the mind–brain structure.
The second problem is that the functions of the mind–
brain system are partly dependent on the initial neuronal
interconnections determined by the genes, but much more
on the very complex neuronal networks generated by
everyday life experiences. The activity of the mind–brain
system is dependent upon the continuous development of
neuronal synaptic interconnections, with each neuron being
connected on average with 10,000 other neurons, so that
the total number of connections probably exceeds 1014. It
should also be remembered that each inter-neuronal syn-
aptic connection can be preserved or discarded depending
on whether the connection is useful or useless, i.e.
depending on the use made of each connection during the
activities of the whole mind–brain system.
Although the exact number of neurons and synapses
present in various species (human and non-human) is not
yet known, it is probable that this number differs greatly
between the various animal species as well as between
individuals of the human species. In conclusion: (a) the
number of neuronal networks in the various species is still
unknown, and (b) most of the information present in the
neuronal networks, so important for the evolution of each
human being, has not been transmitted by the DNA-gene
system, but has been generated during the human life.
7 The mutations of the Broca’s area
Among the most important events within the evolutionary
history of the human brain are the mutations of the Broca’s
area which have generated the human language. The
appearance of vocal language, which probably occurred
100,000 years ago, has forced human beings to abandon
almost completely the communication by gestures. The
generation of language has then become one of the most
important differences between humans and other animals.
The new information generated in the Broca area, however,
is not sufficient for the complete acquisition of language.
Much evidence has now been obtained in favour of the
view that: (a) the potentiality to develop language is not
sufficient to learn the language, and (b) a linguistic envi-
ronment is required in order to provide a suitable education
for learning a language. Language acquisition is dependent
on the properties of the social environment (Chomsky
1975; Edelman 1987, 1993). The functions of Broca’s area
are, then, also an essential, although incomplete, tool for
the generation of intentionality.
8 The concept of intentionality and its effects
on evolution
Following previous suggestions by Wittgenstein, many
philosophers of mind, in particular Searle (1984, 1992,
1997, 2001, 2002, 2004) have concentrated, in the last
20 years, their attention on the fact that the products of the
mind activities tend to direct not only human but also non-
human behaviours towards the satisfaction of their inten-
tions. The intentions of human beings have, on the basis of
Searle’s conclusions, become fundamental biological
properties which tend to direct the human behaviours
towards objects or things. A further conclusion is that
intentions aim to favour the actions and the satisfactions of
all living organisms.
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As pointed out by Searle, the mechanisms of inten-
tionality render the mind–brain system a biological entity
which: (a) is additive to, and independent from, that created
by the DNA–gene system, (b) renders the mental processes
responsible of the properties of free-will as well as of
voluntary behaviours, and (c) is responsible for the most
important properties and behaviours such as those of cul-
ture, science, morality and art. Briefly, the capacity of the
neuronal networks of generating intentional behaviours—
on the basis of an information completely independent
from that produced by the DNA-gene system—provide the
generation of new and additional evolutionary processes to
the human world. These new processes—due to the com-
plex capacities of the products of the neuronal networks
associated with the use of language—determine a com-
pletely novel and different evolution with respect to that
dependent only on the DNA-gene system. This new
intentionality–language promoted evolution operates at
much more rapid rates and at much more global levels as
compared with the evolution dependent on the effects of
the DNA-gene information.
9 The contribution of intentionality and language
to evolution
Since human behaviours of intentional nature appeared
only in the last 80,000–100,000 years, human beings have
been capable—before the appearance of language—of
expressing their intentions in non-linguistic ways. Proba-
bly, human beings not in possession of language, but
willing to transmit their intentions to others, used simple
gestures and body languages. After a long and gradual
evolution, the development of intentional behaviours began
to occur first in primates and then, about 3 million years
later, in human beings. Human beings had, however, to
wait three further million years to achieve the capacity of
using language and then of associating intentions with
language. Although other primates were able to develop
beliefs, desires, and other forms of intentionality in very
primitive forms, only human beings have then been able to
achieve the fantastic results provided by the association of
language with intentions. The language–intention associ-
ation has therefore played a fundamental and unique role in
the complex events which have accompanied the beginning
of the development of modern humans 100,000 years ago.
10 The effects of intentionality generated
by the neuronal networks
The concept of intentionality indicates the great variety of
mental attitudes directed towards either events or the living
states dependent on mind activities: beliefs, fears, hopes,
desires, love, hate, joy, pride, shame, etc. The term inten-
tionality comprises, therefore, the ensemble of properties
that, during the interactions with the outside world, renders
thoughts, feelings and mental attitudes directed towards
entities or events occurring either in the outside world or
within the mental world. According to the language of
philosophers, beliefs, fears, hopes, desires etc. are always
expressions of the intentionality of human beings (see
Searle). In short, the intentionality of the human beings is
the special tool by which the mind regulates the relation-
ships between properties which either remain personal or
lead to contacts with the outer world.
Searle has also suggested that in human behaviours, a
novel fundamental correlation emerges between inten-
tionality and speech acts. In Searle’s view, the intentional
states of the human beings, inasmuch as they are mani-
festations of the states of mind, can be considered equiv-
alent to the interpretations of speech acts (linguistic
expressions). The consequence is that the intentional
states—whose contents, conditions of satisfaction and
directions of adaptation are similar to those of speech
acts—have functionalities also similar to those of speech
acts. In Searle’s view, however, it is the language that
derives its functionality from intentionality, and not vice
versa. This suggestion is in accord with the fact that the
information provided by the logical analysis of human
language explains the mind intentions (which is the infor-
mation provided by the content of the language). The
nature of intentionality may, then, be seen as nothing else
but the expression of the conditions which are required to
realize the satisfaction of human desires. Intentional states,
desires and beliefs have always conditions of satisfaction
and directions of adaptation. The beliefs of human beings
are true or false depending on whether their contents adapt
or do not adapt to the external reality. This means that
human beliefs have a direction of adaptation of the type
mind-to-the world. On the other hand, the desires may be
considered as satisfied depending on whether the content of
the desires of the mind is fulfilled or frustrated by the
world. Therefore, the desires of human beings are satisfied
if fulfilled and not satisfied if not fulfilled: in this case,
then, the satisfaction is of the type world-to-the mind.
11 The nature of consciousness
The concept is very popular that the biological operations
used by the mind to generate consciousness and its prod-
ucts are not physical in nature. My opinion, in contrast with
this conviction, is that if the mind processes, responsible
for all consciousness phenomena, would not be physical in
nature they would never have effects on behaviour. All
242 Rend. Fis. Acc. Lincei (2012) 23:239–245
123
mind operations appear to be capable of interacting with
biological structures which are also necessarily physical in
nature. My conclusion, therefore, is that consciousness and
all its products operate using physical tools. In addition
to this conclusion, I also defend two other points of view.
The first point of view is that consciousness operates as a
normal process of the mind independently of its peculiarity
of being able to operate simultaneously also in the meta-
physical world. The second point of view is that the human
mind has the capacity (still unexplained) of operating
simultaneously both within a third person ontology (which
is responsible for the intentionality processes) and within a
first person ontology (which is responsible for conscious
processes). My conclusion, then, is that all mind products,
independently from being the result of an ontology of first
or third person, are always the result of chemical–physical
operations as are all the other biological entities of the
living world.
12 Development and creativity of the neuronal
networks
The functions and products of the human mind have been
operating, at the beginning of the human life, largely, under
conditions of deterministic chaos, then moving gradually,
depending on the properties of the environment, to the
more complex problems such as those of culture, science,
art, morality and social life. The nature of these functions
and products of the neuronal networks are of great interest
for two reasons. The first is that an evolution of a chaotic
mind–brain system driven by intentional mechanisms is
naturally much more flexible and rapid than one driven by
deterministic mechanisms (operating on the basis of the
principle of chance and necessity). The second is that a
human evolution based on intentionality is much more
creative due the much larger possibilities of choices.
Popper (1934, 1969, 1972) introduced the new concept
of World 3, the world of the human mind products—in
addition to the concepts of World 1 (the physical world)
and of World 2 (the world of the human mental states,
including consciousness). World 3 includes: the human
stories, the material instruments, the scientific problems
and theories, the social institutions and the regulations of
the human societies, the art products, the principles of
morality, and all the other ideas, entities and contributions
elaborated by the human mind during the world history.
I have recently proposed (Azzone 2005) to replace the
famous Cartesio statement (Cogito, ergo sum) with the
statement: I think: then I can create the human world. In
this statement, the human mind is considered responsible of
everything existing in the present and in the future human
world, inasmuch as it has been the human mind which has
provided the creativity necessary for the generation of the
actual world and will generate in the future the innovations
of the natural and social world developments.
13 The generation of free-will
About 1 year ago, a paper by A. R. Cashmore was pub-
lished in PNAS (Cashmore 2010) in defence of a thesis
which is opposite to the one defended in the present paper.
According to A. R. Cashmore: ‘‘the laws of nature do not
accommodate the concept of free will….it is common to
stress that biological systems obey the laws of chemistry
and physics; as living systems we are nothing more than a
bag of chemicals….The irony here is that in reality, a belief
in free-will is nothing less than a continuing belief in
vitalism, a concept that we like to think we discarded well
over 100 years ego!’’. I agree with A. R. Cashmore that if
living systems would be nothing more than a bag of
chemicals then it would be impossible to explain free will.
I think, however, that there are good arguments in favour of
the view that the behaviours of human beings are much
more complex and difficult to explain than are the behav-
iours generated by a bag of chemicals. As discussed in the
present paper, several arguments have been provided
against the view of the operations of the mind–brain system
as produced by a bag of chemicals. Other arguments have
been provided by the comparisons between human evolu-
tion and the evolution of the non-human species. In my
view, it is a deep mistake to try to explain human evolution
and human behaviour using only the information provided
by the DNA-gene systems. As I have discussed previously
(Azzone 2010a, b, c), there are fundamental reasons for
defending the alternative thesis of the operation of dual and
alternative mechanism of human evolution based on the
DNA-gene dependent operations in the initial phase of
development, and on the intentionality-dependent opera-
tions in a second phase. The point is that the intentionality-
dependent evolutionary mechanisms of the human species
produce effects whose nature and results appear as mark-
edly different from the Cashmore’s descriptions of the
DNA-gene-dependent mechanisms. Dennett (2003) has
argued that if, in the present world, all the phenomena
would always be fully obeying to deterministic principles,
it would be impossible to have any form of free-will. If the
human mind would always be operating under conditions
of strict determinism, life and behaviour of human beings
would proceed towards only one type of possible physical
future. The whole life of all human beings would be
completely predetermined and would be nothing else but
an already written book. The question then arises: can the
free-will behaviours of human beings take place in a
completely deterministic world? Physicists defend the view
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that the indeterminism is certainly true at the subatomic
level. But can this subatomic level indeterminism extend to
macroscopic systems? Most physicists would not agree
with this possibility. In order to address the problem of the
non-deterministic behaviours in macroscopic systems such
as human behaviour, let us now consider an alternative
explanation for the mechanism of free-will. A somewhat
slightly similar explanation has been recently discussed by
Kane (1996) and by Dennett (2003). In my opinion, in
order to explain how the human mind could generate the
conditions of free-will, it may be useful to imagine a
somewhat different interpretation of the processes and the
interactions between neuronal and synaptic operations. In
this new interpretation, the free-will types of behaviours of
the mind–brain systems should always be favoured by the
development of extensive series of synaptic interactions
between neurons. The free-will decision would be favoured
by multiple signals (due to series of multiple, although
different, intentions) developed simultaneously during the
interactions between different neuronal networks, and
multiple selections within the gaps which have been
developed in parallel with the behaviours created by the
mind intentionality.
14 Human evolution: the two mechanisms
My view (Azzone 2010a, b, c) is that human evolution is
the result of a very complex process: in the first period,
evolution is concentrated in converting the information
transmitted by the DNA-gene system into the structures of
the molecules and organs that characterize each human
beings; in the second period, evolution becomes concen-
trated in translating the potential information generated by
the gradual development of the mind–brain system into the
large number of tools and concepts which accompany the
generation of novel cultural products. The large variety of
processes accompanying the growth of human beings
suggests that the overall process may be then characterized
by two independent evolutionary mechanisms:
(a) The first mechanism utilizes the information pro-
vided by DNA-genes for the generation of the various
biochemical, physiological, structural components and
functions of the human body. This first mechanism for the
conversion of the information provided by DNA-genes
lasts 9–18 months in the human species, whereas in most
other species its duration is considerably shorter.
(b) The second mechanism reflects the utilization of the
mind’s intentionality following the development of the
neuronal networks. This exclusively human mechanism
can then be further divided into two sections. The first
section generates all the operations required for the use of
language and intentionality, leading to the mastery of both
language and intentionality and determining all personal
behaviours; this section lasts from 3 to 5 years.
The second section develops the procedures of free-will
and voluntary behaviour which are essential for the
acquisition of culture, science, technology, art and moral-
ity. This section has an unpredictable duration because it
depends on the properties of the environment in which each
human being is living, and on the variety of the manual
activities or of the high specializations of culture, science
and art.
In this section, a crucial problem is that of the differ-
ences in cultural background existing among the various
areas and various social environments of human societies.
Because of these deep differences only a great care in
education, combined with proper political and cultural
choices, can avoid the development of a multiplicity of
barriers and social differences existing in the human soci-
eties. These barriers and social differences may be much
deeper than those of a genetic nature and may lead to
dramatic social and political conflicts.
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